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the Money Stock
“We must have a good definition of Money, For
Theory of no-one-knows-what,.:’
nfl
I!HE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of St. Louis
has been, for the last three decades or so, at
the center of an approach to macroeconomic
policy which became universally known as
“Monetarism.” Indeed, the very term entered
the public domain through an article in the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ Review by Karl
Brunner in 1988. The central tenet of monetarism
was that there is a stable demand function for
something called “money.’ Policy advice came
down to recommending that the monetary
authorities should deliver a steady rate of the
growth of money within some target range.
The 1970s were a good time for monetarists.
Velocity in the United States appeared to be on
a stable trend, and the adoption of floating ex-
change rates generated a need for independent
measures of monetary stance in most of the in-
dustrial countries. Monetary targeting was
widely adopted and monetarism became a world-
wide credo. Since the end of the 1970s, however,
life has been much harder for monetarists. The
stability of empirical monetary relationships
became much more difficult to maintain, and
government after government has given up
even the notional attempt to target monetary
aggregates. The allegedly monetarist govern-
ment of Margaret Thatcher abandoned monetary
targets in the United Kingdom in 1985. The
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has
recently announced that the Fed has ceased to
monitor M2 and, instead, will be using the real
interest rate as an indicator of monetary stance.
Only the Bundesbank appears to be retaining
any faith in the significance of monetary aggre-
gates, though they have been widely criticized
for so doing. (Norbert Walter, the chief econo-
we do not, then what have we got, But a Quantity
Boulding (1969, p. 555)
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quoted as saying that “...M3, the broad money
supply indicator targeted by the central bank,
was obviously distorted and devalued as an indi-
cator.” Financial Times, August 10, 1993, p. 2).
The standard explanation for why previously
stable monetary relationships have broken
down is financial innovation. In particular,
liberalization and competition in banking have
generated shifts in demand between compo-
nents of money which have undermined earlier
empirical regularities. tnterest payments on
transaction deposits have made it more difficult
to distinguish money held for transaction from
money held for savings.
Robert Rasche (1993) in his paper to the
St. Louis Fed conference 12 months ago identi-
fied the beginning of the 1980s as a time of a
critical regime change. This structural change,
he claimed, had destroyed the validity of the
traditional St. Louis reduced-form methodology
as a means for explaining and forecasting the
course of GNP. Policy makers around the world
have clearly also been convinced that monetary
aggregates provide little useful information to
guide macro policy.
Presumably, nobody would argue that no
guide to monetary policy was necessary. How-
ever, the advocates of a simplistic policy based
upon any traditional measure of money as the
sole guide are disappearing rapidly.
At the theoretical level, the significance of ex-
ogenous monetary shocks as a cause of business
cycles has been under threat from the so-called
Real Business Cycle school. For them, monetary
disturbances are not the trigger to cycles but,
rather, are an endogenous response to shocks
emanating in the real economy. While this ap-
proach does not necessarily eliminate the validity
of countercyclical monetary policy, it certainly
reduces the significance of the traditional mone-
tarist line that monetary shocks are the primary
trigger to the cycle. Several recent empirical
studies have apparently produced evidence to
support the contention that money does not
have any explanatory power—at least for real
economic activity. (Dc Long and Summers, 1988;
Friedman and Kuttner, 1992, 1993.)
The consensus view emerging from all of this
appears to be that trying to target and control
money is no longer a very sensible thing for
policy makers to do. Monetary policy is now
mainly about setting short-term interest rates,
despite all the well-known difficulties that
choosing the “correct” interest rate entails
(Friedman, 1959).
This paper follows an alternative line of
reasoning, for which there is an overwhelming
theoretical case. There has been a major meas-
urement error in virtually all of the previous
literature on money. Instability in empirical rela-
tionships has been primarily due to the fact that
simple-sum measures of money are not admissi-
ble aggregates on index-theoretic grounds. This
error has been especially important in a period
when characteristics of components which are
added together have been changing.
We do not claim that correction of this meas-
urement error salvages entirely the role of
money as a macroeconomic indicator (though
such may still be the case). Rather, our primary
focus is to see whether acceptable indexes of
money outperform traditional money measures
in conventional tests. As is often the case in
applied studies, the evidence turns out to be
mixed but leaning in favor of the superiority of
weighted over simple-sum aggregates.
Before presenting our own empirical evidence,
we shall first review briefly the evolution of the
concept of money and then the case for an ap-
propriately constructed index.
Ci h/Il .Is .)hk./fll.W/t
The definition of money has not been static
over time. The first identifiable measure of
money was undoubtedly the stock of the physi-
cal commodity which served as currency—
typically precious metal. At some point, certain-
ly by the isth century in England, it was clear
that bank notes had become a major element of
the money stock so that a monetarist at that
time would have had to extend the definition of
money to include notes plus specie in the hands
of the public. By the 19th century, financial in-
novation had moved things a stage further and
the relevant concept of money had expanded
yet again to include bank deposits, which could
be used on demand and could be transferred by
writing a check.
In recent times, the issue has been: Which of
the other highly liquid assets held by the public
should be included? ‘rhe Radcliffe view in the
United Kingdom and the view of Gurley and
Shaw in the United States was that the bound-
ary between money and other liquid assets was
impossible to draw because so many close sub-
stitutes were available. This contention was
FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUiScountered successfully for a while by the evi-
dence that elasticities of substitution were
relatively small (Chetty 1969) and also by the
evidence that predictions of monetarist ap-
proaches were fairly robust to minor definitional
changes. In other words, the general message of
the evidence was not so different if one used
Ml or M2, or even M3.
Such a defense would be much harder to
maintain today than it was 15 years ago. The
introduction of interest payments on checking
accounts in the United States led to a major
reversal of the velocity trend—at least for Ml in
about 1980. In the United Kingdom, abolition of
quantitative ceilings on bank intermediation,
also in 1980, led to a period of rapidly rising
broad money coinciding with very slow narrow
money growth. The innovations which followed
were clearly associated with big movements of
deposits from non-interest bearing to interest-
bearing accounts. In such circumstance, neither
narrow nor broad money proved to be reliable
indicators—at least in the short term.
It would be a mistake to believe that the
composition changes of the 1980s were a new
phenomenon. In Volume Io fA Treatise on
Money, Keynes argued that an unchanged quan-
tity of money could conceal important changes
in circulation as holders transferred money be~
tween cash and savings deposits, and between
income and business accounts. In Volume II, he
reported the statistical finding that the propor-
tion of deposit (savings) accounts to total ac-
counts had risen in Britain from 38 percent to
46 percent between 1920 and 1926. According
to Keynes, “. -. The continual transference from
current to deposit accounts ... [acted as) a con-
cealed measure of deflation (Keynes, 193Db,
p. 10) sufficient to explain a drop in the price
level of 20 percent over the period.
There is nothing remarkable about the fact
that these composition changes have been
noticed before. What is remarkable is that so
many economists were happy to ignore them
for so long in the post-World War II period.
Partly, this was because the regulatory regime
in most countries (interest ceilings and/or quan-
titative controls on intermediation) limited for
some time the significance of the interface be-
tween checking and savings accounts, as well as
the significance of nonbank competitors.
&Foniov ./U/Li//8l/TV .ini/fit
A substantial amount of literature discusses
the concept of money and its measurement (see
Fisher, 1989, Chapter 1, for a survey). At the
risk of oversimplifying, it is sufficient for present
purposes to note that the traditional reason for
regarding money as critically different from
other assets is that it has a direct role in trans-
actions and, hence, has a direct role in the trad-
ing activity of a market economy. According to
the Quantity Theory, the money stock will de-
termine the general level of prices (at least in
the long term) and, according to monetarists, it
will influence real activity in the short run.
For this reason, empirical measures of the
money stock have tried to identify as compo-
nents of money those instruments which can be
used directly in transactions. The problem of
our time is that a whole range of types of
deposits which can be spent, more or less,
directly also yield an interest rate and could,
thus, be chosen as a form of savings as well.
From a micro-demand perspective, it is hard
to justify adding together assets which have
different and varying yields (Barnett, Fisher and
Serletis, 1992). It has long been known that only
things that are perfect substitutes can be com-
bined as one commodity. There is ample evi-
dence that the assets which are commonly
combined in money measures are not in fact
perfect substitutes.
From a micro-foundations perspective this
leaves only two alternatives. The first is to res-
trict attention to a very narrow definition of
money, which only needed non-interest bearing
components. The alternative is to construct an
index number of “monetary services” which
could, in principle, capture the transactions
services yielded by a wide range of financial as-
sets in a superlative way (Diewert 1976, 1978).
Two potential index numbers are the Divisia
index proposed by Barnett (1980) and the Cur-
rency Equivalent (CE) index proposed by Rotem-
berg (1991) at the St. Louis conference in 1989.
‘The attraction of both of these monetary serv-
ices indicators is that they internalize the substi-
tution effects between components of a potential
aggregate and, thus, solve the problem of com-
position changes which was discussed above.
They do not in themselves guarantee the weak
separability of any chosen aggregate, but they
do approximate optimal aggregator functions for
those collections of aggregates which have been
found “admissible” on separability grounds
(Belongia and Chalfant, 1989).
The theoretical case for weighted monetary
aggregates is ovem-whelming—at least to anyone
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with a training in microeconomics and/or index
number theory. The only objection could be on
the grounds that it does not make an improve-
ment over flawed simple-sum aggregates in
practice. There has been a significant accumula-
tion of evidence, however, to suggest that Divisia
aggregates outperform their simple-sum equiva-
lents. For example, Barnett (1980) showed that
some apparent shifts in money demand in the
United States were removed when Divisia meas-
ures replaced simple sum. Barnett and Spindt
(1979) showed the informational superiority of
Divisia over simple-sum measures. Belongia and
Chalfant (1989) find Divisia MIA to have superior
informational content to other admissible ag-
gregates. Barnett, Offenbacher and Spindt (1984)
also find evidence for the superiority of Divisia.
Further support is provided by Serletis (1988).
Lindsey and Spindt (1986) is one of the few
papers which have looked at this comparison to
come out against Divisia, though Fisher and Ser-
letis (1989) is inconclusive.
Belongia (1993) has recently discovered that
using weighted, as opposed to simple-sum,
monetary aggregates alters significantly the con-
clusions that should have been reached by
several recent influential studies. These studies
have, on the whole, adduced evidence that
money is not a “cause” of cycles in real activity.
Hence, this suggests that the problems with
tests of money in the economy in recent years
may be more due to bad measurement theory
rather than to an instability in the link between
the true money and the economy. Rather than a
problem associated with the Lucas Critique, it
could instead be a problem stemming from the
“Barnett Critique.”
The idea of weighted monetary aggregates has
spread outside the United States. Studies include
Home and Martin (1989) for Australia; Cocker-
line and Murray (1981) and Hostland, Poloz and
Storer (1987) for Canada; Ishida (1984) for
Japan; Yue and Fluri (1991) for Switzerland; and
Belongia and Chrystal (1991) and Drake and
Chrystal (forthcoming) for the United Kingdom.
A recent Bank of England study in the United
Kingdom context concludes: “A Divisia measure
of money appears to have some leading indica-
tor properties for predicting both nominal out-
put and inflation...a case can clearly be made
for including Divisia in the range of indicators
analyzed by the authorities when forming their
judgments on monetary conditions.” (Fisher,
Hudson and Pradhan, 1993, p. 63).
A variation on the traditional “closed economy”
tests is provided by Chrystal and MacDonald
(1993). They point out that exchange rate
models have been just as dependent upon
money measures as have demand for money
studies or reduced form tests of monetary policy.
It is no coincidence that exchange rate equations
started to misbehave at the same time as velocity
trends appeared to shift (in the early 1980s), By
replacing simple-sum aggregates in an exchange
rate model by Divisia aggregates, for the dollar-
pound rate, they show that a simple, flexible,
price monetary model can be salvaged as a
long-run proposition - They also find that, when
Divisia measures are used, the short-run fore-
casting performance is far superior on out-of-
sample tests.
We now turn to some empirical results of our
own. The results we shall present fall into two
distinct sections. In the first section, we report
comparisons of simple-sum and weighted meas-
ures of the money supply in the context of St.
Louis Equations. The dependent variable is ac-
cordingly nominal GNP. We are aware of the
problems encountered in the past with such
methods (Rasche, 1993). However, it is a simple,
familiar and well-known context within which
to compare money measures. We are not con-
cerned with the absolute validity of the results
but only with the relative performance of
different measures. Non-nested testing tech-
niques were used to distinguish between vari-
ous indicators of money.
In the second section, we use the more so-
phisticated modern time-series methodology to
test for the existence of short-run and long-run
causal links between money and real activity. It
is this latter question which has dominated the
recent literature. We add to this literature both




In this section, we report results of compari-
sons between traditional simple-sum aggregates,
Divisia measures and the Rotemberg Currency
Equivalent (CE) measure. We use the environ-
ment of a modified St. Louis Equation as a vehi-
cle for these comparisons, and we use non-nested
testing methods to identify superior informa-
tional content. We are well aware with all the
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difficulties associated with the St. Louis Equa-
tion methodology. If we cannot use this struc-
ture at a St. Louis Fed conference, however,
where else can we? More seriously, this method
offers simplicity and transparency. It does at
least give us a feel for the properties of the
data we are dealing with. A methodology more
acceptable to the econometric purist will be
reported in the following section.
None of the data we used was original to this
study. The bulk of it was made available to us
by Michael Belongia at the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, though the U.K. Divisia series
(post-1977) was constructed by the Bank of En-
gland (Fisher, Hudson and Pradhan, 1993). It
should be noted that the time period of the
study differs for each country, depending upon
data availability. Data definitions also vary from
country to country, but space does not permit
an extensive discussion of such differences.
Seasonally adjusted data were used in all cases.
The dependent variable is taken as the first
difference of the log of nominal GDP or GNP.
The first difference of the log of nominal
government spending (federal in the United
States case) on goods and services is used as a
fiscal variable in all cases. A world trade varia-
ble was tested as an external demand variable
but was not found to add explanatory power in
the countries tested. Also tested was an interest
rate variable. This was found to be important in
this context only for the United States. Hence,
the U.S. Equation includes the first difference of
the Treasury bill rate.
The original St. Louis Equation contained lags
of order 0-3. On quarterly data, most economists
would expect to use at least 0-4, so, given the
short data series for some countries, this is the
standard lag length we adopted.
In parallel to the simple St. Louis Equation
format, we also report tests in a version of the
equation which includes the lagged dependent
variable, lagged 1-4 periods. Additionally in this
latter context we report an F test on the exclu-
sion of money from the equation entirely, This
provides useful information, not only about the
relative informational content of different money
measures but also about whether money mat-
ters at all. In some cases Divisia money matters
but simple-sum money does not. The reverse is
never true.
The basic test is to use the same equation in
one case with simple-sum money and in another
case Divisia or CE money. Three test statistics
are reported for comparisons between the two
formulations—the Davidson and MacKinnon
J-test, the Fisher and McAleer JA-test and the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Other tests
have been monitored, including the NT test of
Pesaran and Godfrey and the Wald-type test.
These other tests differ in detail but they do
not alter the overall picture produced. Accord-
ingly, they are not reported here. We refer to
the J-test and the JA-test as being inconclusive
when both formulations reject each other and
indeterminate if neither rejects the other.
The results are reported in Tables 1 to 7 for
the United States, the United Kingdom, Austra-
lia, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Japan,
respectively. Let us consider each.
I 3111(111 SI/MIV/S
The U.S. results are summarized in Table 1.
Simple-sum aggregates Ml and MtA in general
dominate their Divisia equivalents. From M2 on-
wards to broader aggregates, however, the
domination is reversed. This is clear for M2 and
M3, though the difference between Divisia L
and simple-sum L is probably not significant.
This general picture is not altered by the inclu-
sion or exclusion of the lagged dependent
variable.
From the F-tests it is clear that simple-sum
MIA, Divisia M1A and Divisia Ml do not add
significant explanatory power to the equation at
normal significance levels. However, Divisia M2
has the greatest informational content of all the
aggregates tested, though it is only marginally
more significant than simple-sum MZ -
The CE aggregate holds its own against Ml
and M1A, though never establishing statistically
significant domination in either direction. It
loses out to the broader simple-sum aggregates,
however, and also to the broader-based Divisia
measures (the latter result is implied but not
shown) -
Overall, the M2 level of money aggregation
seems superior, though the Divisia aggregate at
this level does not dominate its simple-sum
equivalent sufficiently to make an overwhelming
case for preferring one to the other.
Onjted Kingdom
The U.K. results appear in Table 2. There are
far fewer aggregates to choose from in the U.K.
case. The Bank of England even stopped report-
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St. Louis Equations for the United States: Simple-Sum vs.
Weighted Money
Dependent variable: first difference of the natural log of nominal GNP.
Independent control variables: first difference of the natural log of federal spending on goods and
services: first difference of the T-b.ll rate: the current period value and four lags of each variable
are included as regessors.
Part 1: no lagged dependent variable in regression
Ml vs Divisia Ml
Akaike Information Criterion ~AIC) favors Ml (4.42)
J-test favors Ml (— .1 3.06)
JA-test favors Ml 1-- 72. 2.26)
Ml vs Rotemberg Currency Equivalent (CE)
AIC favors CE (—.24)
J-test inconclusive (274, 2.64)
iA-test indeterminate (1.56: 1.39)
M1A vs Divisia M1A
AIC favors M1A (3.78)
J-test favors M1A (— .59; 2.7)
JA-test favors M1A (— 67. 26)
M1A vs. CE
AIC favors CE (-- 55)
J-test inconclusive (2.7: 2.4)
JA-test indeterminate (1.66: 1.16)
M2 vs. Divisia M2
AIC favors Divisia M2 (—1.1)
J-test favors Divisia M2 (2.42:1.8)
JA-lest favors Divisia M2 (2.04:1.4)
M2 vs. CE
AIC favors M2 (8.75)
J-test inconclusive (24: 4.9)
JA-test favors M2 (92: 3.6)
M3 vs Divisia Ma
AIC favors Divisia M3 (—1.76)
J-test favors Divisia M3 (2.4: 1.5)
JA-test favors Divisia M3 (19: 1.2)
Ma vs CE
AIC favors M3 (6.45)
J-test inconclusive (3.07. 4.7)
JA-test inconclusive (2.05, 2.72)
L vs. Divisia L
AIC favors Divisia L (—31)
J-lest inconclusive (2.35: 218)
JA-test inconclusive (1 6: I.34j
L vs. CE
AIC favors L (7.27)
J-test inconclusive (2.9: 4.8)
JA-test inconclusive (7.2. 3.98)
Note The Akaike Information Criterion is an adjusted dtfference between two values of the likeli-
hood function, It indicates the direction of :nformational advantage but has no critical bounds. The
J and JA tests are t-statistics for the rejection of one model over the other and then the ‘everse.






Part 3: F-tests on exclusion of money from St. Louis Equation
probability
Ml F(5,1O7) = 2.36 10.0451
M1A = 1.88 [0103]
M2 = 4.43 [0.0011
MS = 3.49 jO.006]
L - = 3.69 (0.004]
Divisia Ml = 1.01 (0.418]
Divisia M1A -. = 0.73 [0.600]
Divisia M2 = 4.73 10.001]
Divisia M3 = 4.09 (0002]
Divisia L -, -= 3.86 [0.0031
CE = 2.19 (~O6Oj
Note Exclusion test conducted In equation noluding lagged dependent variable shown in Pan 2
of the table. This is equivalent to the concept of Granger causality tests but neludes contem-
poraneous observations on independent variables
ing Ml and M3 in 1989 because it considered
the data too distorted by financial innovation.
Hence, the only choice using official statistics is
between MO (the monetary base) and M4. The
results show a clear domination of Divisia M4
over simple-sum M4 both with and without the
presence of lagged GDP. The non-nested tests,
however, make it impossible to choose between
Divisia M4 and MO. Also, while the Akaike In-
formation Criterion favors MO over simple-sum
M4, the J-test and the JA-test are inconclusive
and indeterminate, respectively. On the other
hand, the F-test gives informational advantage to
MO, with Divisia M4 running second. Simple-
Results for Australia appear in Table 3. They
show comparisons between M2, M3 and their
Divisia equivalents. The information criterion is
always in favor of Divisia, and the significant
J-tests favor Divisia. More dramatic perhaps are
the F-tests which show that neither simple-sum
aggregate matters at anything close to normal
probability levels, while both Divisia aggregates
do have significant informational content. This
is probably the clearest case available which II-
lustrates the domination of Divisia over simple-
sum aggregates—especially for broad money
measures.
Table 4 contains the results for Germany. The
information criterion generally favors IJivisia
measures over their simple sum counterparts,
with the exception of M3 in the absence of the
lagged dependent variable. All the J- and JA-tests
are indeterminate with the exception of the J-test
which shows dominance of Divisia M2 over M2
Un the presence of the lagged dependent varia-
ble). The same test for M3 is very close to ac-
cepting Divisia M3 as dominating M3.
The overwhelming impression of the German
results, however, is that conveyed by the F-tests,
which show the very low informational content
of all money measures. In this respect, only
Divisia M3 is significant at even the 10 percent
sum M4 has no significant explanatory power at
normal probability levels. This suggests that
Divisia M4 should replace simple-sum M4 as an
indicator of the course of broad money in the
United Kingdom.
:1:
level and the simple-sum aggregates do not obvi~
ously matter at all. This is a surprising result
for a country which has a reputation for sound
monetary policy and adheres to a simple-sum
M3 target. It is possible that the very success of
monetary policy is responsible for a low varia-
tion of nominal income growth, which makes
it hard to establish statistical relationships.
However, it is also possible that Divisia money
measures do a better job in tracking nominal
GDP than their simple-sum equivalents.
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St. Louis Equations for the United Kingdom: Simple-Sum vs.
Weighted Money
Dependent variable: first difference of the natural log of nominal GDP.
Independent control variables: first difference of the natual log at government spending on
goods and services.
Part 1: no lagged dependent variable included in regression
Divisia M4 vs. M4
AIC favors Divisia M4 (3.136)
J-test favors Divisia M4 (1.05; 3.1)
JA-test favors Divisia M4 (—.45; 2.2)
Divisia M4 vs. Mo
NC tavors Divisia M4 (.168)
J-test inconclusive (2.77; 2.72)
JA-test indeterminate (1.52: .96)
M4 vs. MO
ArC favors MO (~-3.2)
i-test inconclusive (3.5; 2.5)
JA-test indeterminate (.49; .77)
Pan 2: tour lags of dependent variable included
Divisia M4 vs M4
AIC favors Divisia M4 (2.32)
J-test favors Divisia M4 (1.3; 27)
JA-test indeterminate (— .16- 1.82)
Divisia M4 vs. MO
AIC tavors MO (— 78)
J-test inconclusive (3.17; 28)
JA-test indeterminate (1.5: .73)
M4 vs. MO
AIC favors MO (—3.69)
J-test inconclusive (3.8: 2.7)
JA-test indeterminate (— 18; — 36)
Part 3: F-tests on exclusion of money from St. Louis Equation
probability
M4 F(5. 78) 1.45 [0.2151
Divisia M4 ~- 2.33 [0.0501
MO -, = 2.83 [0.0211
Note- Test is done in equation from Part 2 including lagged dependent variable. Data period is
1968:3—1992:4.
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— CDexplain the poor perfortDan~of MI. Also, this
should give an advantage to ui-vista MZ and
Divisia MB which is not supported by the data.
Either the Japanese economy behaves very
differently from the others studied or there are
serious data errors underlying this evidence
We now turn to tests of the causal links be-
tween money and real activity using modern
time~Seriesmethods.
TIM.I~ i..~flhiL~ rjfl OF MON EN;
fly ciUJSAL.’~
In this part of the paper we consider Granger
causality tests for a selection of Divisia and
simple-sum money aggregates for each of the
countries referred to in our st. Louis tests- The
causality tests are based on vectors consisting of
real GDP, the GOP deflator, a ~~~asury bill rate
and the relevant measure of the money supply.
Defining our causality vectors in this way facili-
tates separate modelling of the effect that differ-
ent monetary impulses may have particularW in
the short run) on the real and price compo-
nents of GDP- The Treasury bill rate is also in-
cluded in the vector because of the we1l~knoWn
spurious effect money can have on output if an
interest rate effect is excluded (Sims, 1980)- Our
causality tests have a number of other features,
some of which are novel to this paper-
First, for reasons which are now widely ac-
cepted~it is extremely important that the varia-
bles entering the causality vector should be
5~~~ionary and that any indication of cointegrat
ability should be determined (see, Eiigle and
Granget 1987; MacDonald and Kearney, 1987).
The latter aspect of the time~serie5properties of
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‘rhe general class of causality tests employed
in this section of the paper have come in for
some criticism in the literature (see: Zellner,
1979, 1988; llasmann, 1963; and Cooley and
LeRoy, 1985). In particular, it is argued that to
be interpreted as indicating causality from, say,
money to output, Granger-type causality tests
have to be embedded in a structural setting and
appropriate identifying restrictions imposed (see
Holmes and Hutton, 1992, for a partial rebuttal).
However, given our purpose is not to examine
causality for a single measure of money, but
rather to determine which measures from a
Table 5
St. Louis Equations for Switzerland: Simple-Sum vs. Weighted
Money
Dependent variable: first difference of the natural log of nominal GOP
Independent control variable: first difference of the natural log of government spending.
Part 1: no lagged dependent variable included in regression
Ml vs. Divisia Ml
AIC favors Divisia Ml (—.064)
J-test Indeterminate (1.37; —1.31)
JA-test indeterminate (1.35; —1.33)
M2 vs Divisia M2
AIC favors Divisia M2 (—1 84)
J-test inconclusive (2.99; 276)
JA-test indeterminate (—.6. .76)
Part 2: four lags of dependent variable included
Ml vs. Divisia Ml
AIC favors Divisia Mi (— 05)
J-test indeterminate (93; — .87)
JA-test indeterminate (91; —.88)
M2 vs. Divisia M2
AIC favors Divisia M2 (—4.026)
J-test favors Divisia M2 (3.1; 1.5)
JA-test indeterminate (.35; — .27)
Part 3: F-tests on exclusion of money From St. Louis Equation
probability
Ml F(5.39) = 2.9 [0.026)
M2 “ = 0.41 [0.840]
Divisia Ml ‘ = 2.92 [0.025)
Divisia M2 = 2.11 [0.085]
Note: Data period is 1975 2—1989:4.
Ii’oiii lnfl(it),k(daSticiL\ . this i~sneina\ he dealt
~ itli uSing Iii- I!atiscii—~\hiti’Iion—rNtIaIlIeliir
((3 icc Lion tot hi’IeiOskedtsticit\ -
the vector is important, since if there is one (or
more) cointegrating relationships among the vec-
tor, then it is inappropriate to test for causahty
among a vector of first-differenced variables,
because the Granger representation theorem
asserts that such a vector will be misspecified; it
will exclude important ‘long-run” information
contained in the levels of the variables. (This
was a point recognized by Friedman and Kuttner,
1992, in their causality tests on US, data [see
their footnote 19], but they did not include such
long-run elements in their testing framework.) A
second important aspect of any causality test is
that it should be robust to non-normal errors.
Holmes and Hutton (1992) suggest handling this
issue using a non-parametric rank F-test (instead
of the standard F-test used in conventional
causality studies). In this paper, we argue that
since most departures from normality arise
range of simple-sum and Divisia money magni-
tudes have the greatest informational content,
FEDEFAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOWSTable 6
St. Louis Equations for Canada: Simple-Sum vs. Weighted
Money
Dependent variable: first difference of the natural log of nominal GNR
Independent control variable: first difference of the natural log of government spending.
Part 1: no lagged dependent variable included in regression
Divisia Ml vs. Ml
AIC favors Divisia Ml (.34)
J-test indeterminate (.45; .78)
JA-test indeterminate (.09; .46)
Divisia M2 vs. M2
AIC favors Divisia M2 (6.0)
J-test favors Divisia M2 (1.7; 4.8)
JA-test favors Divisia M2 (—.84; 2.5)
Divisia MS vs. MS
AIC favors Divisia MS (3.67)
J-test favors Divisia MS (1.29; 3.5)
JA-test favors Divisia MS (= .39; 2.4)
Divisia L vs. L
AIC favors Divisia L (&43)
J-test favors Divisia L (—.43; 43)
JA-test favors Divisia L (—.99; 3.72)
Part 2: four lags of dependent variable Included
Divisia Ml vs. Ml
NC favors Ml (= .19)
J-test indeterminate (.81; .56)
JA-test indeterminate (.44; .25)
Divisia M2 vs. M2
AIC favors Divisia M2 (3.34)
J-test favors Divisia M2 (1.28; 3.3)
JA-test indeterminate (= .8; 1.04)
Divisia MS vs. MS
AIC favors Divisia MS (2.87)
J-test favors Divisia MS (.55; 2.71)
JA-test indeterminate (— .74; 1.53)
Divisia L vs. L
AIC favors Divisia L (3.49)
J-test favors Divisia L (.49; 2.8)
JA-test favors Divisia L (—.49; 2.17)
Part 3: F-tests on exclusion of money from St. Louis Equation
probability
Ml F(555) = 7.05 (~O0O)
M2 “ = 2.03 (0.088]
MS ‘ = 1.37 (0.250)
L “ = 1.25 (0.299)
Divisia Ml “ = 6.95 [0.000]
Divisia M2 “ = 3.34 (0.010]
Divisia M3 “ = 2.43 [0.047)
Divisia L “ = 2.53 [0.039]
Note: Data period is 1968:3—1987:1.Table 7
St. Louis Equations for Japan: Simple-Sum vs. Weighted
Money
Dependent variable: first difference of the natural log of nominal GNP.
Independent control variable~ first difference of the natural tog of nominal government spending.
Part 1: no lagged dependent variable included In regression
Ml vs. Divisia Ml
AIC favors Ml (.52)
J-test indeterminate (—1.57; 1.86)
JA-test indeterminate (—1.7; 1.72)
M2 vs. Divisia M2
AIC favors M2 (5)
J-test indeterminate (= .7; 1.45)
JA-test indeterminate (—1.09; 1.05)
MS vs. Divisia MS
NC favors MS (.72)
J-test indeterminate (—.62; 1.53)
JA test indeterminate (—101 117)
Part 2 four lags of dependent vanable Included
Ml vs Divisia Ml
AIC favors Ml (503)
J test inconclusive (—1 98 223)
JA test inconclusive (—203 2 18)
M2 vs Divisia M2
AIC favors M2 (44)
J-test indeterminate (= .45; 1.49)
JA-test indeterminate (—1.19; .72)
MS vs. Divisia Ms
AIC favors MS
J-test indeterminate (—.64; 1.56)
JA-test indeterminate (—1.08; 1.15)
Part 3: F-tests for exclusion of money from St. Louis Equation
probability
Ml F(5,42) .79 [0559]
M2 ‘ = .24 [0.942]
MS ‘ = .38 [(1861]
Divisia Ml “ = .65 [0575)
Divisia M2 ‘ = .11 [‘1990)
Divisia MS “ = .14 [0.981]
Note: Data period is 1976:1—1991:2.
we do not believe that the standard criticisms
of our framework have as much import as they
may have for more conventional studies. We
also take encouragement from the fact that We begin the empirical analyses of this sec-
even in recent papers which only address the tion by testing for unit roots in the variables
causality properties of a single money measure entering our causality vector. Although the coin-
(see, for example, Friedman and Kuttner, 1993), tegration method we employ below is due to
Granger-type tests have still been employed Johansen and is, therefore, a multivariate test
(although, we would argue, incorrectly since for the number of unit roots in a given vector,
such tests only involve a vector of differenced we nevertheless thought it worthwhile to exa-
variables), mine some simple univariate unit root rests formotivational purposes, and also to guide us in
the appropriate order of differencing for the
variables entering the cointegrating tests.
There have been, in fact, a variety of pro-
posed methods for implementing univariate unit
roots tests (for example, Dickey and Fuller,
1979; Phillips and Perron, 1988; Stock, 1990;
and Park and Choi, 1988) and each has been
used in the applied macroeconomics literature.
Since, however, there is now a growing consen-
sus that the earliest, unit root test—due to Dickey
and Fuller (1979)—has superior small sample
properties compared to its competitors (see
Campbell and Perron, 1991, for a discussion),
we employ it. In particular, we estimate the fol-
lowing regression equation for the series enter-
ing our causality vector:
(1) ~ç = + fit ++ ,~ y1Ax~-~ +
where ~i sthe variable of interest, ~i and ‘r
denote deterministic regressors (a constant
and a time trend, respectively). Equation 1
represents a reparameterization of an auto-
regression of x~ in levels, where the length of
the autoregression is set to ensure that u, Is
serially uncorrelated. In this context, a test for
a unit root in the series x amounts to a t-test of
it 0 (that is, the sum of the autoregressive
parameters in the levels autoregression is unity).
The alternative hypothesis of stationarity re-
quires that it be significantly negative. Since un-
der the null hypothesis of non-stationarity the
calculated t-ratio will not have a student’s
t-distribution, critical values calculated by Fuller
(1976) must be used instead.
In estimating equation 1 for so many coun-
try/variable combinations, we initially used a
common lag length, q, of 4 for all variables.
However, given the sensitivity of Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests to the chosen lag
length we also experimented with shorter lag
lengths in instances where the estimated f-ratio
on ii- was close to its critical value, this being
particularly so when a variable appeared to be
1(2) - (In particular, and following the recommen-
dation of Hall, forthcoming, and Campbell and
Perron, 1991, we sequentially deleted insignifi-
cant lags of the dependent variable until we ar-
rived at a parsimonious relationship which
satisfied the non-autocorrelation criterion.) In
the reported tables that follow, a shorter lag
length than 4i sdenoted by the number in
parenthesis after the variable mnemonic. Where
the default value of 4 is reported for the ADF
statistic, it means that either all four lags are sig-
nificant or, in instances where some lags are in-
significant, reducing the lag length from 4
would not have made a qualitative difference to
the interpretation.
In Tables 8 through 14, we present our
estimates of the f-ratio for the estimated coeffi-
cient it in equation 1 for the levels and first and
second differences of each series in question. This
procedure facilitates a test for one and two unit
roots, respectively. The f-ratio has been calculated
with the time trend included in the regression
equation, as in equation 1 (referred to as
and the trend excluded (referred to as t). This
follows the sequential testing strategy recom-
mended by, for example, Perron (1988): If a de-
terministic component is excluded from a unit
root test but such a component features in the
data generation process (DGP) of the series, the
resulting test will have low power. However, if
the deterministic component is absent from the
DGP, greater power may be obtained by esti-
mating p without the trend component. In our
unit root tests, all variables, apart from the in-
terest rate series, have been transformed into
natural logarithms. In order to capture any
remaining seasonality in the variables, three
seasonal dummies have been incorporated into
our estimated version of equation 1.
A number of findings emerge from Tables 8
to 14. First, there are only two variables which
appear to be stationary around a deterministic
trend, namely the Australian Treasury bill rate
and the Rotemberg Currency Equivalent measure
—all the other variables appear to contain
stochastic trends. As is common in many other
studies of the time series properties of macro-
economic series, the level of the price deflator
for a number of countries appears to be an 1(2)
process; that is, inflation in these countries is an
1(1) process. Interestingly, it is also the case that
some of our monetary series appear to be 1(2)
processes. tn general we found that this result
(but not the result for the deflator) was particu-
larly sensitive to the lag length specified in the
estimated equation.
For example, in the case of the United States,
all of the simple-sum money measures appeared
to be 1(2) when q was set equal to 4 (DM1A and
DM1 also appeared 1(2) with four lags). However,
in these instances it appeared that this lag
length resulted in an overparameterized regres-
sion equation and the deletion of a single lagTable 8
Unit Root Tests for the United States
L A A2
t,, tr t,L t~r t,, tt
SSM1 —151 —2.08 —3.80 —4.35 —9.18 —9.16
DM1 —1.97 —2.16 —3.61 —4.34 —8.38 —835
SSM1A 0.03 —2.70 —3.61 —3.61 —9.29 —9.29
DM1A 0.77 —2.05 —4.13 —4.21 —9.52 —9.49
SSM2 1.40 —0.23 —3.20 —3.47 —3.37 —8.37
DM2 0.80 —1.78 —4.19 —4.22 —8.21 —8.19
SSMS (1) 1.66 ‘144 —2.93 —336 —914 —9.14
DM3 1.17 —1.27 —3.93 —4.06 —7.79 —7.79
SSL 1.40 —‘161 —1.73 —2.01 —7.05 —7.12
DL 0.95 —1.66 —3.68 —3.74 —7.81 —7.80
GDP —1.73 —2.73 —451 —4.71 —7.69 —7.66
DEF —1.01 —1.94 —1.74 —1.59 —6.52 —6.10
TB —2.31 —2.03 —5.49 —5-64 —11.84 —11.78
ACE —131 —3.70 —4.73 —4.76 —5.16 —5.14
BCE 0.67 —2.59 —3.58 —3.68 —6.38 —6.36
Note: Unless otherwise noted, each ADF statistic was computed with a lag of 3. SS denotes a
simple-sum monetary aggregate; D denotes a Divisia aggregate; M denotes money; L denotes
liquidity; GDP denotes real Gross Domestic Product; DEF denotes the GDP deflator; and TB
denotes a Treasury bill rate. L, A and A2 denote, respectively, the level and first and second differ-
ence of a variable. t~ and t, are augmented Dickey Fuller statistics with allowance for a constant
mean and for a trend in mean, respectively. The 5 percent critical values for t and 11 are —2.89
and —3.43, respectively (Fuller, 1976).
Table 9
Unit Root Tests for the United Kingdom
L A A2
t,, tt t,~ tt tp, tt
SSM4 (2) —0.44 —1.60 —3.07 —3.06 —739 —735
DM4 (1) —0.72 —1.22 —3.64 —3.64 —10.42 —10.36
GDP —1.06 —1.92 —3.81 —3.85 —3.22 —8.18
DEF —2.07 —0.66 —2.71 —3.35 —5.02 —5.07
TB —2.78 —3.12 —5.26 —5.25 —8.07 —3.03
Note: See Table &Table 10
Unit Root Tests for Australia
L A A2
I. t t. t. t, t,
SSM2 0.97 —744 3.21 3.30 —4.76
DM2 0.28 —173 - 302 —ao2 —5.45
SSM3 ~ 2.55 —026 --318 4.24 —4.56
DM3 (2) 739 - -0.43 -3.01 —3.88 —5 17
GDP -022 2.48 —3.68 —364 5.07
DEF 1.15 —1.19 —3.34 -3.46 —4.24
TB —1.73 3.46 —3.53 -331 —5.17
—4.41
—5.12
Note- See Table 8.
Table 11
Unit Root Tests for Germany
L A A2
t,. ttt. t,. t.
SSM2 (1) -075 —1.72 —311 —2.97 -938 —9.43
DM2 (1) —0.45 —1.97 —a74 369 —827 —8.20
SSMS (2) -202 —2.72 —2.96 ‘ 3.23 -6.81 —6.75 DM3 (1) —101 —2.62 -378 —384 —7.65
GDP (1) 024 1.08 —623 —6.21 —1118
DEF (2) 199 —092 —276 --3.21 “724
TB (2) —199 —197 --3.63 -3.58 —6.98 —693
Note. See Table 8.
Table 12
Unit Root Tests for Switzerland
L A A2
t t_ t, t t, t_
SSM1 —117 -2.32 —a43 —340 —5.11
DM1 -1.18 —2.35 —3.44 —3.40 510
-5.07
SSM2 (I) 015 —1.44 —330 —3.31 -7,16
DM2 (1) —119 —191 —319 —3.18 —725
GDP 0.95 —157 —210 —2.78 —481
DEF —1.06 —0.94 —222 —2.03 —4.76
—4.75
TB 176 —1.99 —303 —2.99 ‘584
—487
—581
Nate: See Table 8.
A•C4,/APR~L.Table 13
Unit Root Tests for Canada
L A A2



































































Note See Table 8
Table 14
Unit Root Tests for Japan
L A A
2
t,_ t t,, tI t
12
tT
55M1 —118 —2.78 —3.08 —319 —4.72 -467
DM1 1.19 —2.74 —3.01 —313 —464 —4.60
SSM2 -1.14 2.31 —2.55 —2.65 —3.26 —3.19
DM2 —085 -2.31 -2.08 —1.96 —352 —3.53
55M3 —2.11 -2.22 -244 —241 —269 —2.59
DM3 -134 —258 —170 —1.92 —3.28 —3.28
GNP (1) 0.38 —116 515 -512 —9.41 —929
DEF —207 —2 47 —2.45 —235 . 4.87 5.10
TB —223 —336 —390 —364 -2.83 --271
Note See Table 8made a dramatic difference to the estimated t-
ratio on it (without significantly affecting the
non-autocorrelatedness properties of the residu-
als). Indeed, with three lags all of the money
measures with the exception of simple-sum MS
(SSM3) and simple-sum L (SSL) appear to be 1W;
the former variable appears 1(1) when q= 1,
while SSL appears 1(2) at all lag lengths (again,
the residuals in each of these cases were non-
autocorrelated) -
The country with the greatest preponderence
of monetary aggregates being 1(2) is Canada, in
which six out of the eight chosen monetary ag-
gregates appear to have two unit roots, The
finding that the level of a country’s price series
is an 1(2) process finds confirmation in a num-
ber of other empirical studies (see, for example,
Johansen and Juselius, 1990). Furthermore, the
finding that monetary aggregates are 1(2) has
also been reported by other researchers
(Rasche, 1993), although this finding does not
appear to be as robust as that for price defla-
tors,
We now turn to an analysis of the cointegra-
lion properties of a vector of variables for each
of our chosen countries. In particular, for each
country we use the methods of Johansen (1988,
1991) to estimate the number of cointegrating
vectors in y’ = km, gdp, dc]’, tb], where m
denotes the money supply, x is either ss (for
simple-sum) or d (for Divisia), gdp is real output,
clef is the deflator corresponding to output, and
rb denotes the relevant interest rate (usually a
Treasury bill rate). The fact that the variables
entering y’ may for any one country be a mix
of 1(1) and 1(2) processes has to be taken into
account in our implementation of the Johansen
procedure, since the latter is only appropriate
for 1(1) variables and driftless 1W) variables. We
therefore use the information from our unit
root tests to reduce the order of integration of
any 1(2) variables to 1(1), by entering the first
difference of the level of such a variable. Thus,
if a country’s price level is 1(1), we enter the
change in the price level (equivalent to the infla-
tion rate, since the price level is transformed
logarithmically) and/or if the money measure is
also 1(2), it is also entered in differences.
In the context of estimating a conventional
money demand function (which has the same
‘Dynamic steady-state equilibrium simply involves the addi-
tion of a term in the constant vector of steady-state growth
rates to equation 2, which we omit here for expositional
purposes; this does not affect the subsequent discussion.
set of variables as are contained in our y vec-
tor), Johansen (1991) has suggested dealing with
the two unit roots in m and pb yrespecifying
the y vector to consist of (m-p), y, i and 4.
However, given the nature of the current exer-
cise, and also since, in many instances it is only
p that appears to be 1(2), we do not believe that
such a specification is as attractive as the one
adopted here. To determine the number of unit
roots in y’ we use the following method, due to
Johansen (1988, 1991). This method may be
thought of as the multivariate equivalent of (1).
It is assumed that y, has the following autore-
gressive representation with Gaussian errors




Equation 2 may be reparameterized as
(2’) lAy, = ~t + Hy,~+ ~ 1’,Ay,1
+
where q = k—i, H = E B1
— I, B1 is an (n x n)
matrix from the lag polynomial in the (levels)
k
VAR and I’1 = —L B. for i=1,...q. The key
j=t4I J
difference between I and 2 is that in 2 there is
no allowance for a deterministic trend (or that
the series are driftless) - The long-run static
equilibrium corresponding to 2 is’
(3) H~c 0.
The matrix Hi sthe multivariate analogue of it
in equation 1. Assuming that the variables en-
tering the y vector do not have an order of in-
tegration greater than 1, then the right-hand
side of equation 2 can only be stationary if the
components of
11
Y,k are stationary. This, in
turn, may be determined by the rank, r, of the
matrix H, and, in particular, whether 0 ~ r ~
ii, where n denotes the number of variables in
y. If r=n (that is, H has full rank) then
11
Y,k
can only be stationary if all vi linearly indepen-
dent combinations of Ytk formed using II are
stationary: A standard VAR analysis in levels is
appropriate here. If, at the other extreme, r=0
(and H = 0) then there are no linear combina-
tions in y, which are stationary, and (2) there-
fore becomes a VAR in first differences (this is
the kind of VAR specification used in the
,CH/APR~L19~4majority of traditional Granger causality tests).
If, however 0< i--c vi, II will be of reduced rank
and there must exist (n x r) matrices a and /3
such that II = a(3’, and for
11
Y,k to be station-
ary 13’y,k must be stationary. The /3 matrix
therefore contains the cointegrating vectors and
a represents the matrix of adjustment vectors.
For example, if /3’, is the ith row of /3’ then:
(4) /J’,y—I(O).
Johansen (1988, 1991) has proposed a maxi-
mum likelihood method of estimating all of the
cointegrating vectors contained in H and sig-
nificance tests to determine how many of the
vectors are statistically significant. Since the Jo-
hansen technique is now well-known, we do not
present it here. Instead, we simply note the two
test statistics used to determine the number of
significant cointegrating vectors -
In our application the likelihood ratio, or
trace, test statistic (LR1), for the hypothesis that
there are at most r distinct cointegrating vec-
tors, is
(5) LR1 = T E ln(1-A,),
‘—‘4,
where A,,,,...,A~are then — i-smallest squared ca-
nonical correlations between the y,~ and lAy,
corrected for the effect of the lagged differ-
ences of the y, process (for details of how to ex-
tract the A,’s, see Johansen 1988). Additionally,
the likelihood ratio statistic for testing at most r
cointegrating vectors against the alternative of
r +1 cointegrating vectors is given by equation 4
(6)LR2 = T!n(1—A,,).
Johansen (1988) shows that equations S and 6
have a non-standard distribution under the null
hypothesis. He does, however, provide approxi-
mate critical values for the statistic, generated
by Monte Carlo methods. (The critical values
recorded in Johansen’s 1988 paper are for a
VAR without an intercept term or seasonal
dummies. Since these were included in our em-
pirical analysis, we used the critical values for 5
and 6 reported in Johansen and Juselius, 1990.)
In Table 15, our estimated values of LRI1 and
LR2 are presented, and the critical values and
relevant null hypothesis are reported at the bot-
tom of the table. Consider first the results for
the United States. Interestingly, there is no evi-
dence of cointegration for any of the narrow
monetary measures (i.e. Ml and M1A). However,
with the exception of 55M3, there is clear evi-
dence of one unique cointegrating vector for all
monetary measures which are broader than Ml.
It follows from this that it is the introduction of
these broader monetary measures that produces
a cointegrating set (and not the income, interest
rate or inflation rate). Since the Rotemberg cur-
rency equivalent measure appears to be station-
ary around a deterministic trend, it would
appear not to be an ideal candidate for the
Johansen methodology. However, for complete-
ness, and also since it is often difficult to dis-
criminate between a variable which is stationary
around a trend and one which has a stochastic
unit root, we also test for the numbers of coin-
tegrating vectors in a y vector defined for RCE.
Interestingly, this also gives strong evidence of
one cointegrating vector, as does the BCE mea-
sure. (BCE is a variety of currency equivalence
which uses Divisia weights.) The evidence for
other (non-U.S.) countries in Table 15 is also
suggestive of there being long-run relationships
contained in different specifications of the y
vectors: The vast majority of monetary mea-
sures produce at least one cointegrating vector
and many produce two. Again, there does not
appear to be any split between Divisia and
simple-sum monetary measures in terms of the
production of cointegrating relationships.
The broad picture to emerge from Table 15 is
that there is strong evidence of at least one
cointegrating vector for most country/money
combinations. It also seems that, at least in this
long-run modelling context, there is no sharp
distinction between Divisia and simple-sum
money. It may be, however, that one or other
monetary measures produce more sensible”
estimates of the cointegrating vector and we
return to this point in a later section (where we
also examine sample specific issues which may
be important for the United States). However,
for the implementation of our causality tests,
the main implication to be drawn from Table 15
is that a causality relationship specified simply
in differences will be misspecified for the vast
majority of country/money combinations. We
therefore propose estimating the vector error
correction models implied by our cointegration
results and subjecting them to exclusion tests on
the lags of each of the differenced (either first
or second differenced, depending on the out-
come of the results reported in Tables 8 to 14)
and also on the lagged cointegrating terms. Since
we correct the coefficient variance-covariance
matrix for heteroskedasticity (using the methods
of Hansen, 1980; and White, 1978), the exclusion
tests are performed using linear Wald statistics,Table 15
Estimated Trace and AMax Statistics
United States
Trace (LR1)
SSM1 DM1 SSM1A DM1A SSM2 DM2 SSM3 DM3 SSL DL
0.02 010 0.07 0.14 3.80 5 13 3.45 508 231 477
519 007 7.66 773 1038 1280 8.14 1159 805 10.99
1855 1805 1783 1869 2334 23.34 20.54 21.91 2065 21.53
4017 38 13 33.73 40.25 57.92 58.85 4767 52.35 5499 53.27
United States
AMAX (LR2)
SSMI DM1 SSM1A OM1A SSM2 DM2 SSM3 DM3 SSL DL
0.02 0.01 007 0.14 3.80 5.13 345 5.08 2.31 4.77
5 18 5.06 7.59 7.58 6.58 7.66 4.66 6.51 5.73 6.22
13.35 1788 10.16 10.97 1294 10.63 12.39 10.32 12.60 10.53
21.61 20.08 15.90 21.56 34.58 35.41 27.13 30.44 34.34 31.74
United Kingdom
Trace (LR1) AMex (LR2)
SSM4 DM4 SSM4 DM4
1.89 3.85 1.89 3.85
10.20 12.17 8.31 8.32
38.34 37.53 28.13 25,36
88.45 64.20 50.12 26.67Table 15 (continued)
Estimated Trace and AMax Statistics
Australia
Trace (LR1) AMax (LR2)
SSM2 DM2 55M3 DM3 SSM2 DM2 SSM3 DM3
0.01 0.75 0.61 0.12 0.01 0.74 0.06 0.12
10.51 5.74 10.77 6.23 10.50 4.99 1071 6.12
21.89 2693 31.97 2312 1138 21.18 2119 16.88
53.96 5567 67.61 5641 3207 28.74 3564 33.79
Germany
Trace (LA1) AMax (LR2)
SSM2 DM2 SSMS DM3 SSM2 DM2 SSM3 DM3
0.02 0.28 0.81 068 0.01 0.03 081 0.68
II 11 12.62 17.08 1844 11.10 1234 1626 1776
2962 39.21 40.02 43,56 18.51 2658 2294 2511
6338 7727 7038 8155 33.75 3806 3037 3798
Switzerland
Trace (LR1) AMax (LR2)
SSM1 DM1 SSM2 DM2 SSM1 DM1 SSM2 DM2
059 0.60 049 153 059 060 0.49 153
1554 15.50 1241 13.29 1493 1489 11.91 1176
3555 3557 3391 33.71 2001 2007 21.49 2041
5674 57.08 6482 60.78 2118 2151 3591 2708Table 15 (continued)
Estimated Trace and AMax Statistics
Canada
Trace (LR1) AMax (LR2)
SSM1 DM1 SSM2 DM2 SSM1 DM1 55M2 DM2
2.35 2.67 077 0.16 2.35 2.67 0.77 0 16
15.06 15.00 8.28 6.66 12.71 12.33 751 650
41.85 4342 21.36 17.74 2679 28.41 1307 11 08
79.71 81 55 53.38 5568 3786 3813 3203 3795
Japan
Trace (LR1) AMax (LR2)
SSM1 DM1 SSM2 DM2 SSM3 DM3 SSM1 DM1 55M2 DM2 SSM3 DM3
3.09 30.08 2.42 0.62 3 46 3.03 3.04 3.08 2 42 2.62 3 46 303
1274 12.97 16.28 1503 16.91 15.41 9.64 9.89 1385 12.41 1345 12.37
32.26 32.19 38.76 34.97 3939 35.25 1951 19.21 2247 19.95 2248 1983
6514 67.00 71.17 69.63 6729 64.82 32.88 34.81 32.41 34.65 27.90 2956
Null hypotheses and 5 percent critical values for Trace and AMax statistics.
Trace AMax
Null 5% Critical Null 5% Critical
Hypothesis Value Hypothesis Value
r-c3 818 r=3 r=4 8.18
r<2 1795 r=2 r=3 14.90
rd 3153 r=1 r=2 21.07
r=0 4828 r=0 rt-1 27.14
Note’ Variables are defined in Table 8 The Trace and AMax statistics are defined in the text.
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Causality Tests for the United States
SSM1 GDP DEE TB
SSMI 87.21 ~000) 419(038) 422(038) 1743 (000)
GDP 1 22(0 87~ 28 67 (0 00) 4.63(033) 1061(003)
DEF 2.85 (058) 555 (0.23i 5656 (000) 1344 (000)
18 4.00(000) 2745(000) 6.28(018) 1959 ~0O0j
DM1 GDP DEF TB
DM1 37.88 (000) 538 (025) 504 (0.28) 566 (0.23)
GOP 0 17(0 99) 2808(000) 453(0.34) 10.85(003)
DEF 139(084) 586(021) 5246(0.00) 1185(002)
TB 17.32(000) 2833(000) 681 tO 15) 1001(0.04)
SSM1A GDP DEF TB
SSM1A 68.74(000) 1 07(0.89) 12.78 (0.01) 40.14 (0.00)
GOP 2.73 (060) 2240(000 237(000) 11 39(002)
DEE 4.90 tO 29) 5 16(0.27) 6457 (0.00) 1051(0.03)
TB 21 86 (0 00) 21.22 (0 00) 9 45 (0.05) 24 78 (0 00)
DM1A GOP DEE TB
DM1A 5730(000) 112 (089) 12.54 (0.01) 1712(000)
GDP 345 (0.48) 26.46 (000) 3.30(051) 1379(000)
DEF 377(044) 5.59(023) 61.65(000) 1239(001)
TB 1681(0.00) 21.17(000) 9.29(005) 2356(000)
SSM2 GDP DEE TB
SSM2 4863(000) 734(012) 4.82 (0.31) 675(015)
GDP 1367(000) 9.73 (004) 1.50(083) 7.53(011)
DEF 2093 (000) 8.51 (007) 2376(0.00) 1457(0.00)
TB 2736(000) 13.97(000) 14.23(000) 1242(001)
ECM 1723 (0.00) 2.25 (013) 8.29(000) 060 (0.44)
DM2 GDP DEE TB
DM2 2371(000) 997 (004) 1074 (0.03) 923 (0.05)
GDP 1009 (004) 778 (009) 2.45 (0.65) 18.64 (0.00)
DEE 6.72 (0.15) 695 (0 14) 26.71 (0.00) 6.73 (0.15)
TB 9524 (000) 18.35 (0.00) 18.51 (0.00) 1447 (0.00)
ECM 1839 (000) 4.52(003) 12.19 (0.00) 474 (0.03)
SSM3 GDP DEE TB
SSM3 8912(000) 504(028) 874(007) 104(090)
GDP 11.88 (0.02) 15.23 (0.00) 2.61 (063) 980(004)
DEF 12.32 (002) 684 (0.14) 2513 (0.00) 10.49 (003)
TB 10.52 (0.03) 2228 (0.00) 13 14 (0.01) 991(0.04)
ECM 8.50 (0.00) 068(041) 13.25(000) 267(0.10)RCE1 37.52 (0.00) 11 78(0.02) 5.27(026) 32 10(0.00)
GOP 1722(000) 9.47 (0.05) 0.87(093) 11.08 (0.02)
DEE 3.55 (047) 7 18 (0 13) 53.72 (0.00) 694 (0.14)
TB 1783 (0.00) 15.47 (0.00) 492(079) 1016 (0.04)
RCE2 GDP DEE TB
RCE2 26 14 (0.00) 857 (007) 1033 (0.04) 2856 (000)
GDP 1607(000) 1365 (000) 1.69(079) 13 13(001)
DEF 2.86 (0.58) 7.11(013; 4238(000) 7.11 (0 13)
TB 1666 (000) 16.36 (0.00) 802 (009) 1004 (0.04)
ECM 764 (0.00) 1.72(018) 434 tO 04) 4.74 (0.03)
BCE GDP DEF TB
BCE 12.78 tOOl) 5.66 (023) 5.61 tO 23) 7.02 (0 11)
GOP 7.41 (0 12) 983 (004) I4 6(0.83) 2056 10 OOj
DEF 409 (039) GOb (0.19) 3072 10.00) 851 (0.07)
TB 6227(0 001 17.52(000) 1219(0.02) 12.95 (0.01)
ECM 0.27 tO.60 446 (003) 179 (0.02~ 644 1001)
Note The variables arc- as def.nod in Table 8. The variacie at the Coiur’mrl head is tne dependent
variable The numbers not n paremilheses are linear Wald stalisfies. while the numbers in paren-
theses are marginal sign!4icance l~vels
Table 16 (continued)
Causality Tests for the United States
DM3





38.22 (0.00) 8.64 (0.07) 10.82 (0.03) 7.16 (0.13)
9.20 (0.05) 9.37 (0.05) 3.21(0.52) 18.27 (0.00)
6.45 (0.17) 6.58 (0.16) 29.61 (0.00) 6.61 (0.16)
78.27 (0.00) 18.73 (0.00) 18.79 (0.00) 15.62 (0.00)
14.58 (0.00) 3.02 (0.08) 13.77 (0.00) 5.66 (0.02)
SSL GOP DEE TB
92.18 (0.00) 716 (013) 7.96 (0.09) 2.54 (0.64)
24.22(0.00) 15.34 (0.00) 3.17 (0.53) 1007(0.04)
13.82 (~00) 6.94 (014) 16.05 (0.00) 10.64 (0.03)
20.63(0.00) 27.57 (0.00) 13.11 (0.01) 11.04 (0.03)
17.05(0.00) 0.75(0.38) 13.69(0.00) 1.17 (0.27)











33.11 (0.00) 12.01 (0.02) 7.79 (DM9) 7.39(0.12)
12.87 (0.01) 10.37 (0.03) 2.91 (0.57) 14.26 (0.00)
6.47 (0.16) 7.07 (0.13) 26115 (0.00) 7.05 (0.13)
68.23 (0.00) 23.47 (0.00) 16.64 (0.00) 15.57 (0.00)
14 45 (000) 27 6( 009) 11 96 (0 00) 394 (0 04)
ROE1 GOP DEE TBTable 17
Causality Tests for the United Kingdom
SSM4
SSM4 GNP DEE TB
3989 (000) 026 (099) I 90 (075) 17.59 (000)
GNP 11 20(002) 239 (0.66) 9.08 (0.06) 10.22(004)
DEE 28 74 (0 00) 2 79 (0 59~ 5 28 (0.26) 39 7~041)
TB 444(035) 3.97 (0.41) 11.99(002) 866(007)
ECM 426(012) 846(001) 24.38 (0.00) 1071(000)
DM4
DM4 GNP DEE TB
1558 (0.00) 488 (030) 1459 (0.001 13.52(000)
GNP 143(0.84) 191(075) 618(019) 760(011)
DEF 1630(0.00) 2 17(070) 1223(0.02) 8 15(008)
TB 6.58 (0.16) 358(046) 574(0.22) 211(072)
ECM 454 (0.10) 0.92(063) 2767(0.00) 203(036)
Note- See Table 16.
there is a clear differential impact. For example,
in terms of the output equation, the Divisia
monetary measure is significant at the 5 percent
level in three cases (namely, DM2, DL and
RCE1) and at the 7 percent level in two in-
stances (that of DM3 and BCE1), but none of
the simple-sum money terms enters significantly
even at the 10 percent level. It is also interesting
to note that among the two currency equivalent
measures, it is onlythe RCE measure which fea-
tures significantly in the real output equation
(confirming the significant influence for this
monetary measure noted by Belongia, 1993).
The significance of these Divisia measures is
repeated in the deflator equations (apart from
RCEI, although, additionally, DMIA is also sig-
nificant), although in these equations one of the
simple-sum measures is also significant (for
SSMIA). With respect to monetary causality in
the United States, TB equations, both simple
sum and Divisia seem to do equally well in that
each measure has significant strikes.
The U.K. evidence, reported in Table 17, con-
trasts sharply with that for Switzerland. Neither
M4 nor Divisia M4 affects real GNP. However,
Divisia M4 does influence the inflation rate.
Both money measures influence interest rates.
Thus, the superiority of Divisia M4 over M4 is
confirmed (at least so far as inflation is con-
cerned), but the lack of causality from money to
real activity is noteworthy.
The Australian results, recorded in Table 18,
differ from the U.S. results in that the TB rate
does not have a significant short-run influence
in any of the real output equations or in the
price equations. However, in common with the
U.S. results, Divisia money is significant—both
M2 and M3—in the real output equation, whereas
the simple-sum measures are not. In contrast,
however, it is the simple-sum measures which
have a significant short-run impact in the TB
equations rather than the Divisia measures.
There are also significant long-run influences in
all of the equations, although these do not seem
to be confined to any particular measure of
money.
For Germany, none of the monetary impulses
—neither Divisia nor simple-sum—appears with
a significant influence in the real output equa-
tions, although there would appear to be an in-
terest rate effect in this equation for the two
sum measures of money. Real GDP has a signifi-
cant influence in all of the money equations,
apart from SSM2. The joint effect of the TB rate
is significant in all of the money equations and
inflation, in turn, has a significant impact on in-
terest rates.
Both simple-sum and Divisia monetary meas-
ures have also a significant influence on infla-
tion and the TB rate in the Swiss case (Table
20), although in contrast to the German caseTable 18
Causality Tests for Australia
SSM2 GDP DEE TB
55M2 18.76 (0.00) 9.05 (0.06) 7.06 (0.13) 18.18 (0.00)
GDP 3.21 (0.52) 1606 (000) 30.92 (0.00) 3.45 (0.48)
DEE 5.40 (0.25) 17.95 (0.00) 19.35 (0.00) 5.33 (0.25)
TB 21.29 (0.00) 2.51 (064) 6.18 (0.18) 13.15 (0.01)
ECM 068 (0.41) 2.32(012) 0.07 (0.79) 8.68 (0.00)
DM2 GDP DEE TB
DM2 19.24(000) 9.15 (0.00~ 424(037) 3.87 ~0.42)
GDP 4.07 (0.39) 1568 (000) 22.32 (0.00) 4.91 (0.79)
DEE 608(0.19) 16.68 (0.00) 19.61 (0.00) 4.01 (0.40)
TB 449(034) 4.24 (0.37) 4.75 (0.31) 11.81 (0.02)
ECM 4.07 (0 04) 8.07 (0.00) 35 9(0.06) 0.70 (0.40)
SSM3 GDP DEE TB
SSM3 17.40 (0.00) 727 (0 12) 2.91 (0.57) 9.72 (0.04)
GOP 15.78 (0.00) 11 46(002) 38.99 (0.00) 4.66 (0.32)
DEE 10.38 (0.03) 1267 (0.01) 18.73 (020) 5.74 (0.22)
TB 1291(0.01) 2.67 (0.61) 621(0.18) 19.21 (0.00)
ECM 1876(000) 10.14 (0.00) 7.54 (002) 6.52 (004)
DM3 GDP DEE TB
DM3 27.15(000) 1494(000) 2.53(064) 1.47 (0.83)
GDP 4.24 (0.37) 24 13 (000) 30.65 (000) 5.45 (0.24)
DEE 7.99 (0.09) 24.23 (0.00) 15.79 (0.00) 6.71 10.15)
TB 5 05 (0.28) 4.99 (0.28) 4.88 (0.29) 11 33 (0 02)
ECM 0.13 (0.72) 5.41 (0.02) 0.02(088) 6.78 (000)
Note Sec Table 16.Table 21
Causality Tests for Canada
SSM1 GNP DEE TB
SSM1 348(048) 1022 (0.03) 479(031) 277(054)
GNP 632(018) 711 (013) 327(051) 1155(002)
DEE 209 (0.72) 1589 (000) 10.53 (0031 5.54 (0.23)
TB 894 (0.06) 1 91(075) 3.98 (0.41) 16.95 (0.00)
ECM 15.08 (000) 11.46 (000) 1.80 (0.40) 902 (001)
DM1 GNP DEE TB
DM1 539 (0.25) 8.89 (006) 516 (027) 3.82 (043)
GNP 11 20 (002) 709 (013) 5.95 (0.20) 9.65(004)
DEE 234(067) 34.00 (0.00) 16.58 (0.001 7 17(0 12)
TB 7.88 tO 09) 9.18 (0.05) 1.39 (0.84) 1668(0.00)
ECM 1696(000) 46.18 (000) 068(071) 501(008)
SSM2 GNP DEE TB
SSM2 2225(000) 665(016) 12.36 (0.01) 462(033)
GNP 5.24(076) 275 (060) 4.74 (0.31) 15.11 (000)
DEE 10.13(004) 757(0.11) 2968(0.00) 1907(000)
TB 49.24(000) 5.11(028) 606(0.19) 1116(002)
ECM 0.04 (0.83) 985 (000) 0.68 (041) 0.78(038)
DM2 GNP DEE TB
DM2 3089 (000) 1 24 (0.84) 5.46 (0.24) 697 (014)
GNP 8.97(006) 202(073) 289(068) 1225(0011
DEE 8.61 (0.07) 11 33 (002) 19.24 (000) 1959 (0.00)
TB 2585 (0.00) 241 (066) 354 (0 47) 988(004)
ECM 2 81 (0 09) 7 53 (0 00) 0.60 (0.44) 0 11 (0 74)
both Divisia measures appear significant in the
output equation, as does SSM1. In common with
a number of other countries, the TB rate has a
statistical influence in all of the output equa-
tions and in three of the money equations. It is
noteworthy that the joint effect of inflation is
statistically significant in three out of four of
the output equations.
The Canadian results (Table 21) portray little
significant impact of money on any variable (the
exceptions being 55M3 and DM3 in the TB equa-
tion). Interest rates also do not have the same
significant role to play as they did in the U.S.
case for real output, although they do feature
in the majority of money equations. The effects
of price (or, more correctly, inflation) feature
prominently in almost all of the TB equations.
The Japanese causality pattern (reported in
Table 22) is in many ways similar to that for
Germany. Thus, neither simple-sum nor Divisia
money enters significantly into the output equa-
tion, although there is a significant impact of
both types of money in the inflation and TB
equations. The TB rate also features significantly
in all of the Japanese real output equations but,
in contrast to the German case, only enters sig-
nificantly into one other equation (apart from
its own lags)—that for DM3.
FEDERAL RESERVE RANK OF St LOUISTable 21 (continued)
Causality Tests for Canada
SSM3 GNP DEF TB
SSM3 6496(0.00) 6.30(017) 725(0.12) 13.12(001)
GNP 825(008) 4.25(037) 724(012) 1593(000)
DEE 7.34(0 12) 8.13 (0.08) 2025(0.00) 2709 (000)
TB 1658(000) 700(0.14) 9.04 (0.06) 1008(004)
ECM 000(095) 13.33 (0.00) 0.34 (0.56) 1.02(031)
DM3 GNP DEE TB
DM3 22.32(000) 1.27(086) 5.27 (0.26) 10.69 (0.03)
GNP 12.82 (001) 4.67 (0.32) 4.01 (040) 13.26 (0.01)
DEE 2696(000) 608(0.19) 18.74 (0.00) 21.38 (0.00)
TB 1352(0.00) 1 88(076) 300(056) 774(0.10)
ECM 296 (0.23) 12.18(000) 1 20 (0.55) 052 (0.77)
SSL GNP DEF TB
SSL 15.36 (0.00) 1 63 (0.80) 097 (091) 6.39 (0.17)
GNP 3 51(0.48) 1 67 (0.79) 4 97 (0.29) 11.61(0.02)
DEE 398(0.41) 11.92(002) 2064(0.00) 2011(0.00)
TB 750(0.11) 1.78(086) 3.87(042) 1404(0.00)
ECM 1.15(078) 11 48(0.00) 0.51 (0.48) 0.57(045)
DL GNP DEE TB
DL 5915(0.00) 1 38(0.84) 1.38(084) 4.19(038
GNP 1429 (0.00) 225 (0.68) 398 (041) 9.38(005)
DEE 15.84 (0.00) 9.52(004) 21.27(000) 16.82 (0.00)
TB 9.34 (0.05) 2.04 (0.73) 378(044) 1011(0.04)
EcM 1.97(016) 8.55(000) 058(0.44) 009(0.76)
Note: See Table 16
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Causality Tests for Japan
SSM1 CNP DEF TB
SSM1 6.82 (0 15) 1 69 (079) 430(0.37) 837 (0.07)
GNP 4.81 (031) 25.08 (000) 3.82 (0.43) 3.47 (0.48)
DEE 2.56(063) 7.61 (0 11) 32.52 (000) 7.85 ~0.09)
TB 3.84 (043) 983 (004) 7.39(0 12) 10.65 (0.00)
ECM 10.66 (0.00~ 1233(0.00) 655 (0.04) 10.94 (0.00)
DM1 CNP DEE TB
DM1 11 93 ~002) 1 46 (0 83) 3.97 (0 41) 8.89 (0.06)
ONP 525 ~0.26) 24.64 t0.00~ 3.75 (0.44) 3.39 (0.49)
DEE 2.21 (0.69) 804 (0.08) 34.01 (000) 7.92 (0.09)
TB 4.57 (0.33) 9.17 (0.06) 717 (0.13~ 1925(0.00)
ECM 11.36(000) 12.17 (0 00) 6.54 (0.04) 11.16 (0.00)
SSM2 GNP DEE TB
SSM2 3902 0.00) 1 10 (089) 1041(0.03) 1406 (0.00)
GNP 6.02 (0.19) 21 36(0.001 4.33 (0.36) 616(0 18)
DEE 775 ~0.l0) 6.37 ~0.17) 3558(000) 5.18(027)
TB 713(013) 12.22 (0.02) 710(013) 17.47(000)
ECM 9.15(001) 14.14(000) 3.61 (016) 10.97 (0.00)
DM2 GNP DEE TB
DM2 57.64 (0 00) 1 04 0 90) II 72 (0 02) ii .08 (0.03)
GNP 4 36 (0 36) 22 02 (0.00~ 3 92 (0 42) 2 25 (0 34)
DEE 9 19 005) 8 15(008) 3441 (000) 804(0.09)
TB 884 tO 06) 1-4.81 (000) 640(0.17) 21 34(0.00)
ECM 683(0 Oar 1331 (001) 3.78(015) 15.b? iO 00)
SSM3 GNP DEE TB
SSM3 472-I (000; 074 (094) 853(007) 1392(0 01)
GNF 406(O39~ 1925(0001 34~(048) 737(011)
DEl 6.97(0’4) 639~0~?~ Z403(000) 649(0i6~
lB 703w13) iO.49~003) 6971014) 1(581000)
ECM 7 Pt (002; 1259(0 00) 357(016) 1003:000)
DM3 CNP DEE TB
66 (003 073 092; ‘2 ~6 002 1393 1302;
GN? 319 iG’3 2091000 323 (052) -459 10331
-lEE 9 fltOO4, 813 tO 0~) 337 cOO; 820 (0.08)
941 ~0Fi 1393 toon~ 640(0 17) 21081300;
EG.-i. 607 (~i05~ 13 o~Door 357(3 4) 14.56 iO GUI
F’~orsSec Iaj!e ~6105
Table 23
Estimated Trace and AMax Statistics: United States
Sub—Samples
TRACE (LR1)
SSM1 DM1 SSM1A DM1A SSM2 DM2 SSM3 DM3 SSL DL RCE BCE
1.02 086 0.02 057 325 0.02 083 001 1.44 006 6.07 0.16
11.23 1242 12.96 1350 i655 1029 12.11 11 13 14.31 144 2099 901
2931 30.18 30.33 2934 3689 27.23 2747 27.33 34.77 28.69 41.70 3004
53.90 5392 52.67 51 00 6229 49.45 54 19 5009 63.07 5037 6790 5669
AMAX (LR2)
SSM1 DM1 SSM1A DM1A SSM2 DM2 SSM3 DM3 SSL DL RCE BCE
102 ~86 0.02 057 325 002 083 001 1A4 006 6.08 016
1022 11.56 12.93 1344 1530 10.28 1129 11.12 12.86 938 9.38 884
18.07 1776 17.37 1582 1734 16.94 1535 1619 20.46 2046 20.46 2103
24.60 2374 2234 21.66 2640 2221 26.72 2276 2891 2891 2628 2666
;S:fr1n~nLp ft ii ID
I.Lnlled ales: Inc lftst~i92li
.lleodine 1.1bongo
The causality results reported in the previous
section are for the longest span of data for
which consistent simple-sum and Divisia data
are available for each country. Within each
country-specific data sample, there may be one
or two changes in the way monetary policy has
been implemented. Thus, some countries have
switched from targeting one particular aggregate
to another or have switched from monetary tar-
geting to interest rate targeting, or vice versa.
Therefore, it is of interest to inquire if the
results reported in the previous section carry
through for sub-samples corresponding to
specific monetary regimes. One of the possible
examples of a regime change arises in the Unit-
ed States around 1980, when a combination of
reforms (including a change in Fed operating
procedure and a liberalization of deposit mar-
kets) produced an apparent shift in previously
stable monetary relationships (Rasche 1993).
Given this, and also since the U.S. data sample
is one of the longest, we concentrate our sub-
sample tests on our U.S. data set. In particular,
we have re-estimated our U.S. causality tests for
the first quarter of 1960 to the third quarter of
1979 (lags being generated within this sample).
In Table 23, the estimated Trace and Amax
statistics are reported for our chosen U.S. sub-
sample. In contrast to the full sample results, it
is noteworthy that all of the monetary measures
produce at least one cointegrating vector (for
the full sample, none of the Ml monetary meas-
ures produced any cointegrating vectors). We
therefore use the information concerning the
number of cointegrating vectors to set up ap-
propriate VECMs for each monetary measure.
The sub-sample exclusion tests based upon
these VECMs are reported in Table 24. The
broad conclusion to emerge from this table is,
perhaps not surprisingly, that the sub-sample
produces a very different picture with respect
to the relative merits of simple-sum and Divisia
money. More specifically, we note that the sig-
nificant impact of money in the real output
equations occurs for the narrow Ml measures
of money and not for the broader measures
(and, in terms of the Ml measures, simple sum
seems to outperform Divisia since two of the
sum measures are significant at the 5 percent
level against one Divisia measure at this sig-
nificance level) - Of the two currency equivalent
measures, BCE is insignificant in the GDP equa-
tion, while BCE is significant (albeit at the 6 per-
cent level of significance) the reverse of our
findings for the full sample. Other notable fea-
tures of the sub-sample results, which are dis-
MAROH/AFRL. 1994Table 24
Sub-Sample Causality Tests for the United States
SSM1 GDP DEE TB
SSM1 57.23 (0.00) 11.28 (0.02) 13.04 (0.01) 32.78 (0.00)
GDP 5.87 (0.21) 2.44 (0.65) 1.98 (0.74) 6.99 (0.14)
DEE 887 (0.06) 5.34 (0.25) 39.38 (0.00) 111(0.89)
TB 15.20 (0.00) 5.94(020) 6.52(016) 41.57 (0.00)
ECM 5.55 (0.02) 9 99 (0 00) 0.42 (0.52) 0.49 (0.48)
DM1 GDP DEE TB
DM1 2714(000) 10.69 (0.03) 1516(000) 1857(000)
GDP 0.62 (0.96) 4.29 (0 37) 353 (0 47) 8.27 (0.08)
DE~ 3.80 (0.43) 731(0 12) 11.99 (0.02) 1.04(0.90)
TB 22.95 (0.00) 5.28 (0.26) 8.33 (0.08) 22.31 (0.OOj
ECM 1.20(027) 10.22 (0.00) 3.29(007) 003(0.87)
SSM1A GDP DEE TB
SSM1A 40.06 (0.00) 10.76 (0.03) 16.73 (0.00) 30.93 (0.00)
GOP 7.13 (0.13) 3.64 (0.46) 4.18 (0.38) 5.72 (0.22)
DEE 4.79 (0.31) 6.82 (0.14) 20.98 (0.00) 0.41 (0.98)
TB 15.13 (0.00) 5.14 (0.27) 8.94 (0.06) 42.39 (0.00)
ECM 1 81(0.18) 10.80 (0.00) 296(0.08) 0.04 (0.83)
DM1A GDP DEE TB
DMIA 26.63 (0.00) 8.14 (0.08) 19.14 (0.00) 17.75 (0.00)
GDP 0.85 (0.93) 4.69 (0.32) 7.34 (0.12) 7.02(0 13)
DEE 3.74 (0.44) 8.36 (0 08) 4.94 (0.29) 0.22 (0.99)
TB 2591(0.00) 5.31 (0.26) 11.08 (0.03) 23.14 (0.00)
ECM 000 (0.97) 9.33 (0.00) 7 17(0.00) 0.12 (0.73)
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Sub-Sample Causality Tests for the United States
SSM2 GDP DEE TB
SSM2 45.44 (0.00) 6.54 (0.16) 11 22(002) 1730(000)
GDP 3.53 (0.47) 7.48(011) 293(0.57) 722 (0.12)
DEE 5.73 (0.22) 999(004) 1.14 (0.88) 4.03(040)
TB 46.46(000) 202(073) 648(0.17) 35.07 (0.00)
ECM 808(001) 1569(000) 966(000) 1.38 (0.50)
DM2 GDP DEE TB
DM2 45.70 (0.00) 6.06 (019) 17.51 (0.00) 8.73 (0.07)
GDP 531(0.26) 910(006) 416(039) 1008(0.04)
DEE 4.53 (0.34) 5 14(0.27) 20.15(0 00) 5.75 (0.22)
TB 76.87 (000) 2.69 (0.61) 802 (0.09) 26.04(000)
ECM 363(0.05) 0.16(069) 326(0.07) 2.13 (0.14)
SSM3 GDP DEF TB
SSM3 7422 (0.00) 1 01(091) 20.52 (0.00) 488 (029)
GDP 500(029) 527 (0.26) 7.44(011) 726(0.12)
DEE 435(036) 9.62(005) 272(061) 1.99 (0.74)
TB 1543(000) 10.61 (003) 1113(0 031 2520(000)
ECM 4.23 (004) 1022 (000) 1481(0.00) 079 (037)
DM3 GDP DEE TB
DM3 9838(000) 289 (057) 18.94(000) 985 (0.04)
GOP 8.00 (009) 5.71 (0.22) 9 10(006) 434(0.36)
DEE 988 (0.04) 8.99(006) 268 (061) 094(0.92)
TB 3856 (000) 3.23 (052) 1872 (000) 25.78 (0.00)
ECM 6.14 (0.01) 1094 (0.00) 925 (000) 0.18 (0.67)
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